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Escaping Forced Gang Recruitment:
Establishing Eligibility for Asylum
After Matter of S-E-GAlexandra Grayner*
After the Board of Immigration Appeals denied asylum to three siblings fleeing forced
gang recruitment in Matter of S-E-G-, asylum claims based on forced gang recruitment
are almost categorically denied. This Note describes how courts interpret and apply
Matter of S-E-G- unfairly to preclude viable asylum claims based on membership in a
particular social group. Given the chance to establish the facts in their individual records,
certain individuals from Central America who have fled forced gang recruitment should
be able to establish their eligibility for asylum. Proving that they are members of
particular social groups which are both “socially visible” and “sufficiently particular” will
be the most difficult hurdles. Nevertheless, a brief from the Department of Homeland
Security provides insight on how to accomplish this task so that deserving individuals
may be granted asylum.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I would like to
thank my faculty advisor, Professor Karen Musalo, for introducing me to this topic while we
conducted interviews in El Salvador as part of the U.C. Hastings Refugee and Human Rights Clinic.
Without input from Professor Musalo and help from the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies,
writing this Note would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the editors of the Hastings
Law Journal for their hard work in the editing process. This Note is dedicated to the victims of gang
persecution who seek safe haven in the United States.
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Introduction
Imagine you are a fourteen-year-old boy from El Salvador living in
a poor neighborhood controlled by MS-13, one of the strongest gangs in
the country and the world. Your older brother and uncle are both in MS13. As with half of the schools in El Salvador, there are eight to ten gang
1
members who attend your school. One day, two schoolmates who are
members of MS-13 tell you that it is time for you to join the gang. But
you watched your mother grieve over your older brother’s criminal life
1. Juan J. Fogelbach, Gangs, Violence, and Victims in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
12 San Diego Int’l L.J. 417, 432 (2011).
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and have no desire to follow in his footsteps. You tell the gang members
“no” and bear through a beating after school. They reply, “You better be
careful, because no one turns down MS-13.” The next day, another boy
in your neighborhood is shot and killed by MS-13 gang members. It is
rumored that while undergoing initiation into MS-13, the boy refused a
gang member’s demand that he shoot a taxi driver. Then your schoolmategang members approach you and warn: “You’re next.” Fearing for your
life, you run away from your hometown to stay with an aunt in San
Salvador.
Soon after arriving in San Salvador, you realize that the gang
members have traced your footsteps. You call home and learn that your
brother, under pressure from his fellow gang members, told MS-13
members where your aunt lives. The gang contacted other MS-13
members who live nearby and told them to harass you until you join the
gang. The next week, the MS-13 members demand that you join, and
beat and threaten you when you refuse. You fear for your life and know
you must leave the country to be safe. You decide to leave El Salvador
and apply for asylum in the United States.
You are caught at the border, and when asked by immigration
agents whether you fear persecution in your home country, you explain
your reasons for coming to the United States. A pro bono lawyer takes
your case. She explains that although you have a well-founded fear of
persecution, it will be difficult to prove that you were persecuted on
account of one of the five grounds protected by asylum law. In 2008, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied asylum to three siblings
2
who fled forced gang recruitment in Matter of S-E-G-. Ever since, courts
have categorically denied asylum claims of individuals who base their
3
claims on resistance to forced gang recruitment. Your lawyer tells you,
however, that your asylum claim must be adjudicated on the individual
facts and circumstances of your case. She will try to distinguish Matter of
S-E-G- to prove your eligibility for asylum. It will be difficult, but she
will cite a brief written by the Department of Homeland Security to show
4
how you meet the requirements for asylum. If she succeeds, you will
begin a new life free from gang violence, a life you never knew in El
Salvador.

2. 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 590 (BIA 2008). The same day that the BIA decided Matter of S-E-G-, it
published a similar opinion, Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2008). Although both opinions
are relevant to this discussion, this Note refers almost exclusively to Matter of S-E-G- because that
opinion includes more analysis and is cited more frequently.
3. See, e.g., Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 2010); Mendez-Barrera v.
Holder, 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2010); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 2009);
Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2009).
4. See Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, In the Matter of [redacted]
[hereinafter
DHS
Supplemental
Brief],
available
at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/
Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf.
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This Note explains why certain individuals from Central America
who have escaped forced gang recruitment should qualify for asylum
based on their membership in a particular social group (“PSG”). The
Note is divided into four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of forced
gang recruitment in El Salvador and explains how certain segments of
society are more vulnerable to forced gang recruitment than are
members of the general population. Although Part I focuses on El
Salvador, similar conditions of forced gang recruitment exist throughout
Central America. Part II outlines the BIA’s current criteria for individuals
seeking asylum based on their membership in a PSG, and focuses in
particular on social visibility and particularity, two relatively new
requirements that have been criticized as arbitrary and unworkable. Part
III examines Matter of S-E-G- and explains how the holding—that the
applicant’s proposed PSGs lacked social visibility and particularity—may
be limited to the facts of that case. Part IV uses a brief from the
Department of Homeland Security to show how segments of Salvadoran
society most vulnerable to forced gang recruitment can articulate a
cognizable PSG that is both socially visible and sufficiently particular. The
Conclusion provides further recommendations for future asylum seekers
fleeing forced gang recruitment.

I. Persecution on Account of Resistance to
Forced Gang Recruitment
For fifteen years, individuals from Central America have sought
asylum in the United States because they fear persecution on account of
5
their resistance to forced gang recruitment. This Note does not argue
that all gang members join involuntarily. Many gang members join to
escape a troubled life and to seek support, protection, and financial
6
resources. Mounting evidence reveals that certain individuals in Central
7
America are more vulnerable than others to gang recruitment. When
these individuals resist recruitment efforts, they are subject to retaliation,
8
which may include threats, beatings, and even death.
The following Subparts describe conditions in El Salvador that
should qualify certain individuals for asylum as members of a PSG.

5. See Sebastian Amar et al., Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., Seeking Asylum from
Gang-Based Violence in Central America: A Resource Manual 11 (2007); Wash. Office on
Latin Am., Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide 3 (2008).
6. See Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 423 (“With limited exceptions, there are no reports indicating
that MS-13 and M-18 systematically hand select individuals and force them to become gang
members.”).
7. See id.; see also Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law Sch., No Place to Hide: Gang,
State and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador 30–31 (2007).
8. See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee Claims
Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs 7–8, 21 (2010) [hereinafter UNHCR].
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Research for this Note includes reports on gangs in Central America and
10
El Salvador in particular, as well as personal interviews with
11
government officials and NGO workers in El Salvador. But Central
America’s two most notorious gangs—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
Calle Dieciocho (18th Street Gang)—also wield powerful networks of
12
control in Guatemala and Honduras. To the extent that analogous
conditions exist in those countries, similarly situated individuals who
have resisted forced gang recruitment should also qualify for asylum.
A. The Rise of Gangs: Case Study on El Salvador
Gangs’ ubiquitous rise to power in El Salvador has both domestic
13
and international roots. El Salvador’s twelve-year civil war ended in
1992, but the war’s legacy lingered within a society riddled with high
14
levels of violence, poverty, illiteracy, and few opportunities for youth.
Amnesty laws, passed one year after the war ended, granted human
15
rights abusers immunity from legal consequences for their war crimes.

9. See generally Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., Gangs in Central America
(2009); U.S. Agency for International Development, Central America and Mexico Gang
Assessment (2006) [hereinafter USAID]; Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central
America and Those Who Flee Their Wrath, 20 Geo Immigr. L.J. 407 (2006); Fogelbach, supra note 1.
10. See Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7; Juan J. Fogelbach, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
and Ley Anti Mara: El Salvador’s Struggle to Reclaim Social Order, 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 223 (2005).
11. The three interviews conducted by the Author were: Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya
Cobar, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (Ministry of Justice and Public Security), in San
Salvador (Oct. 22, 2010); Interview with Mario Francisco Mena Méndez, Jefe de la División de
Admisión, Evaluación, y Diagnóstico, Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo Integral de la Niñez y
la Adolescencia (Dir. of the Div. of Admission, Evaluation, and Diagnostics, Salvadoran Inst. for Dev.
of Youth and Adolescence), in San Salvador (Oct. 20, 2010); Interview with Zaira Navas, Inspectora
General de la Policía Nacional Civil (Gen. Inspector of the Nat’l Civil Police), in San Salvador (Oct.
20, 2010). Other interviews conducted by the Harvard International Human Rights Clinic’s research
team are also cited.
12. For more information on gang violence in Guatemala and Honduras, see Elyse Wilkinson,
Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Social Visibility Requirement for Victims of Gang
Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 Me. L. Rev. 387, 394–95 (2010).
13. See Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 1–2, 20.
14. See id. Although the civil war is cited as one of the domestic causes for the rise of gangs in El
Salvador, the United States
funneled billions of dollars in economic and military aid to the Salvadoran government and
military throughout the 1980s. Although Congress conditioned military aid to El Salvador
on semi-annual reports certifying that the Salvadoran government complied with human
rights standards, human rights organizations charged that the U.S. continued to fund the
Salvadoran military despite its responsibility for widespread rights abuses.
Id. at 4. See generally Comision de la Verdad Para El Salvador, de la Locura a la Esperanza: La
Guerra de 12 Años en El Salvador (1993).
15. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 8. Many of the alleged human rights abusers
were members of or were connected to the Salvadoran government and military. For a detailed
discussion of El Salvador’s amnesty law, see Margaret Popkin & Nehal Bhuta, Latin American
Amnesties in Comparative Perspective: Can the Past Be Buried? J. Ethics & Int’l Aff., Mar. 1999, at
99, 103–08.
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Today, impunity persists within El Salvador’s weak and often corrupt
institutional structure, which essentially sanctions the violence and
16
lawlessness that allows gangs to control many aspects of public life.
During the civil war, thousands of Salvadorans fled to the United
17
States, and many settled in Los Angeles. Many of the young male
immigrants joined gangs that were already established in Los Angeles:
18th Street, a gang named after 18th Street in Los Angeles and
18
composed primarily of Mexican youth, and MS-13, a gang formed by
19
Salvadoran youth.
In 1996, changes in U.S. immigration laws significantly expanded the
20
criminal deportation grounds for both legal and illegal immigrants.
Over 33,000 Salvadorans were deported between 1998 and 2004; many
21
were gang members. When gang members arrived in El Salvador, they
recruited poor and uneducated local youth, luring them into gang life
22
with money and power. Experts believe that the deportation of gang
members from the United States was the catalyst for the development of
23
a U.S.-style gang culture in El Salvador.
In the last fifteen years, the rise of gangs has been recognized as an
24
international phenomenon. Gangs’ criminal networks exhaust law
enforcement efforts and are gaining numbers, strength, and power. In El
25
Salvador, gangs are very different today than they were ten years ago. In
the mid to late 1990s, gangs were mostly small and local neighborhood26
based. Largely in response to government crackdown efforts, gang
leaders consolidated their power and formed the MS-13 and 18th Street
27
gangs. Both gangs now operate through local subgroups known as clikas
16. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 7.
17. Id. at 20–21.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21 n.77 (“The changes to immigration laws were included in two major pieces of
legislation passed in 1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.) and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.)).”). For more information on the impact of IIRRA on gangs in Central
America, see generally Freddy Funes, Note, Removal of Central American Gang Members: How
Immigration Laws Fail to Reflect Global Reality, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 301 (2008).
21. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 22 n.79 (citing Department of Homeland
Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2004, tbl.43 (2004)).
22. Id. at 22.
23. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 22.
24. Id. at 20–24; see 60 Minutes: The Fight Against MS-13 (CBS television broadcast Dec. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/01/60minutes/main1090941.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;2.
25. Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note 11. The National Civic Police
estimates that there are approximately 10,500 gang members in El Salvador, but the National Council
on Public Security estimates that the number is closer to 39,000. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra
note 7, at 24.
26. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 25.
27. Id.
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(cliques) that control the communities in which they operate, and also
coordinate with one another throughout El Salvador and surrounding
28
regions.
The increasingly sophisticated nature of gang networks renders it
nearly impossible for a target of gang violence to escape while within the
29
country or region. One social worker described it candidly: “One can’t
be sure if one is on the list of people to be killed, but one can be sure that
30
if one is on that list, one will be found and killed.” Being a target of
gang violence can become an inescapable reality for many. Often, the
only choice is to run beyond the gang’s sphere of influence.
B. State Response
In 2003, the Salvadoran government began to implement a series of
31
Mano Dura (firm hand) laws to show that it was getting tough on gangs.
The first Mano Dura law was struck down as unconstitutional because it
allowed police to arrest those who they believed to be gang members
based on their appearance or “illicit association” with other gang
32
members. Because the police did not have to link any crime to the
person they were arresting, innocent young men were arrested solely
33
because they lived in gang-controlled neighborhoods. In 2004, the
Salvadoran government passed another anti-gang measure, Super Mano
Dura, which survived constitutional review by making association with
34
gang members an aggravating circumstance, as opposed to a crime. This
did not change police conduct, however, because authorities continue to
harass innocent young men because they look like or associate with
35
suspected gang members.
Although Super Mano Dura survived constitutional review, it failed
in its ultimate goal of curtailing gang violence. Homicide levels increased
36
from 33 per 100,000 in 2003 to 56 per 100,000 in 2006. Though many
gang members were arrested, the vast majority were released for lack of

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 91 (quoting Jeanne Rikkers, Coordinator of CRISPAZ, San Salvador (Aug. 21, 2006)).
31. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 37–42; see Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia [Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice] (Dec. 52-2003/562003/57-2003) at Falla 16, IV, 3, B (Apr. 1, 2004).
32. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 39–40.
33. Id. at 37–42. Ten days before the law was set to expire, the Supreme Court of El Salvador
held that Ley Anti-Maras was unconstitutional. Id. at 39–40. On the very same day, the President
submitted a new bill to the Legislative Assembly to criminalize gangs’ “delinquent activities,” as
opposed to gang membership in general. Id. at 41. Many judges refused to enforce this second
temporary law because it created the same human rights violations that made the first law
unconstitutional. Id. at 41–42.
34. Id. at 42–45.
35. Id. at 84–95.
36. Wash. Office on Latin Am., supra note 5, at 4.
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proof that they committed a crime. Salvadoran authorities are criticized
for the Mano Dura laws’ ineffective and counterproductive emphasis on
massive arrests and for its lack of crime investigation and social programs
38
to address the root causes of gang violence. The effect of Mano Dura
strategies also gave gang leaders an opportune moment to consolidate
regionally based gangs, enhance their levels of organization, and wield
39
more power. Gangs changed their behavior to avoid arrest and began to
40
discourage tattoos and encourage dressing “like any normal kid.” Gang
members became indistinguishable from the innocent people living within
gang-controlled areas.
In 2003 and 2004, there were many prison riots associated with
41
intra-gang violence. Prison authorities sought to mitigate this violence
42
by segregating prisoners according to gang affiliation, but segregation
brought gang members together and enabled them to operate more
43
effectively and clandestinely.
C. Forced Gang Recruitment
As gangs have become more sophisticated and powerful, their
methods of recruiting new members have become more coercive and
44
violent. Gang mentality is centered on reputation and respect, and
gangs retaliate against individuals who refuse recruitment efforts because
45
resistance is perceived as an act of disrespect. Some former gang
members attest to the use of coercive recruitment tactics. One stated,

37. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 49. From 2003 to 2004, over 19,000 people were
arrested for belonging to a gang, but 84% were released because there were no grounds for their
arrests. Id.
38. Seelke, supra note 9, at 10–11; Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 48; Wash.
Office on Latin Am., supra note 5, at 4; Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note
11; Interview with Zaira Navas, supra note 11.
39. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 26; Wash. Office on Latin Am., supra note 5, at
4; Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note 11.
40. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 27 (quoting B.F., staff member at a youth center).
41. Id. at 12–13; see Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note 11.
42. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 12–13; see Interview with Edgardo Alberto
Amaya Cobar, supra note 11.
43. Wash. Office on Latin Am., supra note 5, 3–5.
44. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 30–32; see UNHCR, supra note 8, at 2–3.
45. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 30; UNHCR, supra note 8, at 2; Thomas
Boerman, Central American Gang Related Asylum Cases: Background, Leverage Points and the Use of
Expert Witnesses, Immig. Daily (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.ilw.com/articles/2009,1215-boerman.shtm.
In addition to resisting gang recruitment, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has identified
broad categories of persons who are opposed to gangs and are targeted for retaliation as a result.
These categories include individuals who refuse recruitment, women who refuse sexual demands,
business owners who are unable or unwilling to meet extortion demands, witnesses of crimes, law
enforcement agents, ethnic and sexual minorities, and community activists such as NGO workers,
lawyers, and church-based groups that outspokenly oppose gangs. UNHCR, supra note 8, at 2. This
Note focuses on those who resist recruitment.
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“We killed several [people in the neighborhood] for not wanting to join
46
us.” Another said, “Today if you’re not part of the gang, they kill you;
joining a gang is the only way of surviving in the environment. Before the
47
gang was like your family; now you have to join or they kill you.”
People who morally oppose gangs but who cannot escape their ambit of
control are perceived by gang members as disrespectful and deserving of
48
punishment.
Within El Salvador, certain segments of society are more vulnerable
to forced recruitment. A former asylum officer has identified at least
three categories of individuals who may be more susceptible to forced
recruitment: (1) individuals from gang-controlled neighborhoods,
49
(2) young men who spend time in prison, and (3) at-risk children.
Because the individuals in these groups are more likely to be recruited by
a gang, they face a greater risk of harm for refusing a gang’s recruitment
efforts.
50
Gangs recruit young males from the territories they control.
Edgardo Amaya Cobar from El Salvador’s Ministry of Justice and
Security explains: “Gangs have strong control over certain territories.
Young people in a particular community who want an undisturbed,
normal life will have to become a member of the gang that controls that
51
community . . . .” In some neighborhoods, gangs wield so much control
52
that police officers must ask permission from the gang’s leader to enter.
Well-intentioned youth raised in gang-controlled neighborhoods are
53
more susceptible to repeated harm and recruitment efforts. “There is a
saying in some El Salvadoran neighborhoods . . . if you’re not in a gang,
54
then you’re against gangs.” This commonplace notion coerces innocent
youth from gang-controlled communities into joining a gang, either to
55
save their own lives or those of their loved ones.
Young men in detention centers and prisons are also more susceptible
56
to forced gang recruitment. Current and former gang members explain
that they “joined a gang in prison in exchange for protection from other

46. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 78 (alteration in original) (quoting an interview
with a former gang member).
47. Id. at 76–77 (quoting an interview with a former gang member).
48. UNHCR, supra note 8, at 2.
49. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 429–33.
50. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 61–63.
51. Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note 11.
52. Id.
53. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 429.
54. Id.
55. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 30 (citing Interview with José Miguel Cruz,
former Dir., Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (Univ. Inst. for Pub. Op. Research), San
Salvador (Mar. 31, 2006)).
56. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 430.
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prisoners.” An unfortunate effect of El Salvador’s Mano Dura laws was
58
a dramatic increase in the prison population. El Salvador has nineteen
penitentiaries with a total inmate population of 24,051, but the country’s
59
prison capacity is only 8000. Crowded prisons provide ample
opportunities for gangs to recruit other prisoners and expand their
networks.
Gangs are increasingly recruiting younger members, meaning that
certain segments of the Salvadoran youth population are the targets of
60
gang violence at an early age. Several sources indicate that gangs target
children less than twelve years old because they are too young to face
61
legal charges. Street children are particularly vulnerable. Social workers
who work with street children attribute the decline in the number of
62
street children, from 5000 in 2007 to 800 in 2008, to gang recruitment. El
63
Salvador’s new administration under President Mauricio Funes has
developed promising programs to prevent street children from joining
64
gangs. But Mario Mena Mendez, the Director of Diagnostics and
Evaluation for El Salvador’s Institute for Development, believes these
65
programs will likely suffer from inadequate funding.
Schoolchildren are also vulnerable. Gang members frequently
66
demand payments from schools, and threaten and harass the students.
There are an estimated eight to ten gang members at each of over half of
67
the schools in El Salvador. Many children are forced to deliver
messages, distribute contraband, or stand as lookouts before they are
68
incorporated into complete gang life. Experts believe that gangs are
increasingly approaching younger children, sometimes even children who
69
are eight or nine years old.
All of these groups are at great risk of gang violence. Individuals in
these groups are likely to live in constant fear of persecution from gangs,

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 31.
61. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 431 n.81.
62. Id. at 432.
63. President Carlos Mauricio Funes Cartagena, representing the Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional, or FMLN, was elected in 2009. The FMLN is critical of past administrations’
strategies of massive gang arrests without the emphasis on social programs. The last Mano Dura law,
however, is still in effect. See Wash. Office on Latin Am., supra note 5, at 3. Notably, FMLN is a
leftist political party in El Salvador, and used to be the umbrella organization of guerrilla groups
during the civil war.
64. Interview with Mario Francisco Mena Mendez, supra note 11.
65. Id.
66. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 432.
67. Id.
68. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 31.
69. Id.
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and sometimes have no other choice but to flee their home country and
seek asylum in the United States.

II. Asylum and Membership in a Particular Social Group
Individuals seeking asylum in the United States may qualify if they
have a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
70
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Although asylum applicants who have resisted gang recruitment may apply
71
for asylum based on their political opinion and religion, such claims are
72
beyond the scope of this Note. Here, the focus is on explaining why
certain individuals who have resisted gang recruitment should be eligible
for asylum based on their membership in a PSG.
Membership in a PSG is the most ambiguous of the five grounds for
asylum. For this reason, it is also the most contentious ground. Since the
asylum statute does not define a PSG, circuit courts usually defer to the
BIA, the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying
73
immigration laws. In 1985, the BIA in Matter of Acosta defined a PSG

70. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2010). Once an individual establishes statutory eligibility for
asylum, the Attorney General of the United States has the discretion to grant her asylum. Id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A). Applicants who have suffered persecution in the past enjoy a presumption of a wellfounded fear of persecution in the future. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2012).
71. See, e.g., Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (denying asylum for
lack of nexus to the PSG “family members of youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by
the [gangs] and who have rejected such membership”); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st
Cir. 2010) (denying an asylum claim based on political opinion, religion, and membership in the PSG
“young women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment”); Marroquin-Ochoma v.
Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 2009) (denying an asylum claim based on anti-gang political
opinion); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying an asylum claim
based on membership in the PSG “young Honduran men who have been recruited by the MS-13, but
who refuse to join”); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 2008) (denying an asylum claim
based on anti-gang political opinion and membership in the PSGs “(1) Salvadoran youth who have
been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the
gang based on their own personal, moral and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities;
and (2) family members of such Salvadoran youth”); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 591, 593 (BIA
2008) (denying an asylum claim based on anti-gang political opinion and membership in the PSGs
“persons resistant to gang membership” and “young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with
gangs”). Gang-persecution claims also include applicants who did not resist gang recruitment, but
rather were opposed to gang rule in general. See, e.g., Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744–45
(9th Cir. 2008) (denying an asylum claim based on anti-gang political opinion and membership in the
PSG “the class of young men in El Salvador who share the immutable characteristic of resistance to
violence and intimidation of gang rule”); Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162. 1165 (9th Cir. 2009)
(denying an asylum claim based on anti-gang political opinion and membership in the PSG “criminal
government informant[s]”).
72. For scholarly articles discussing the possibilities of seeking asylum under the political opinion
and religion theories, see generally Matthew J. Lister, Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and
Prescription, 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 827 (2008); Michele A. Voss, Young and Marked for Death:
Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social Group” in Asylum Law to Include Youth Victims of
Gang Persecution, 37 Rutgers L.J. 235 (2005).
73. See Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
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as a social group where members share a “common, immutable
characteristic” that they “either cannot change, or should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
74
consciences.” One judge lauded the Acosta definition for striking “an
acceptable balance between (1) rendering ‘particular social group’ a
catch-all for all groups who might claim persecution, which would render
the other four categories meaningless, and (2) rendering ‘particular social
group’ a nullity by making its requirements too stringent or too
75
specific.” The Acosta definition makes sense because it captures the
essence of the other four grounds of asylum—race, religion, nationality,
and political opinion—all of which concern characteristics that
individuals either cannot change or should not have to change because
they are so fundamental to the applicant’s identity or conscience.
Recently, however, the BIA added two additional requirements for
76
PSGs: social visibility and particularity. Although the social visibility
and particularity requirements are widely criticized as vague and
unreasonable, they are the primary reason why courts deny asylum to
applicants who resist gang recruitment and assert PSG claims. The
following Subparts explain the prevailing interpretations of social
visibility and particularity, at least to the extent possible based on
contradictory case law.
A. Social Visibility
In 2006, the BIA for the first time in In re C-A- denied an asylum
77
claim because the applicant’s proposed PSG was not socially visible.
The BIA explained that social visibility is the “extent to which members
of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members
78
of a social group.” The asserted PSG in In re C-A- was “noncriminal
79
drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel.” The BIA
explained that “[w]hen considering the visibility of groups of confidential
informants, the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is
80
generally out of the public view.” Subsequent cases clarified that social
81
visibility is a new requirement.

biainfo.htm (last visited May 1, 2012).
74. 19 I.&N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (BIA 1985).
75. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006).
76. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 582 (BIA 2008).
77. 23 I.&N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (BIA 2006), aff’d, Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d 1190, cert. denied sub
nom. Castillo-Arias v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 977 (2007).
78. Id. at 957.
79. Id. at 961.
80. Id. at 960.
81. See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.&N. Dec. at 58 (denying an asylum claim based on
membership in a PSG for failing to meet the social visibility and particularity requirements).
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Since its inception, the social visibility requirement has been
82
criticized as illogical and arbitrary. The BIA had meager support when
83
it created the social visibility requirement. In an effort to show some
foundational basis for its departure from the Acosta standard, the BIA
84
cited the United Nations’ Social Group Guidelines’ definition of a PSG.
But in citing the Guidelines, the BIA misconstrued the Guidelines’ twotiered approach to defining a PSG. The Guidelines suggest defining a
PSG through two alternative approaches: the “protected characteristic”
85
approach and the “social perception” approach. In In re C-A-, the BIA
cited the Guidelines for support in requiring both a common, immutable
characteristic (the “protected characteristic” approach) and social
86
visibility (the “social perception” approach). The UN Refugee Agency
maintains that the BIA incorrectly interpreted the Guidelines and that a
87
PSG need be identifiable through only one of the approaches, not both.
Moreover, application of the social visibility requirement has caused
confusion and inconsistent decisions, prompting frustrated judges to
question its validity. Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has criticized the social visibility requirement because “a
member of a group that has been targeted for assassination or torture or
some other mode of persecution . . . will take pains to avoid being
88
socially visible.” Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit has noted that
unless the PSG involves a tribe or clan, the social visibility requirement
“is not very helpful to deciding cases because the abstractness allows
89
most disputes to be decided either way.” And in an unpublished
decision, Judge Bea of the Ninth Circuit pointed to the many questions
left unanswered by the prevailing definition of social visibility:

82. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a
“Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation
and Gender, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 47 (2008); Eugenia Pyntikova, Seventh Circuit Decision in
Gatimi v. Holder Rejects Social Visibility as Necessary Criterion for Membership in a “Particular Social
Group,” 24 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 101 (2009); Elyse Wilkinson, Examining the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ Social Visibility Requirement for Victims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 Me. L. Rev.
387 (2010); Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae, In re Thomas (BIA 2007) (No. A-75-597-033/-034/-035/-036), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/45c34c244.html.
83. In re C-A-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 951, 961 (BIA 2006).
84. Id. at 956.
85. United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the
International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan 17, 30 (2009).
86. 23 I.&N. Dec. at 956.
87. Brief for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae, In re Thomas (No. A-75-597-033/-034/-035/-036), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/45c34c244.html.
88. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
89. Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1216 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Our opinions note that “social visibility requires that the shared
characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by others
in the community.” But we have not specified the relevant community
for this analysis (Petitioner’s social circle? Petitioner’s native country
as a whole? The United States? The global community?). Nor have we
specified whether “social visibility” requires that the immutable
characteristic particular to the group be readily identifiable to a
stranger on the street, or must simply be “recognizable” in some more
90
general sense to the community at-large.

Prior cases may not consistently identify the “relevant community,”
but courts can look to other BIA decisions to answer Judge Bea’s second
inquiry. Interpreting social visibility to require that shared characteristics
be readily identifiable to a stranger on the street would be inconsistent
91
with established case law. The BIA has recognized a PSG of women
92
who fear being subject to genital mutilation and a PSG of homosexual
93
men. The shared characteristics in these PSGs are not literally visible to
94
the naked eye. Although it is nearly impossible to articulate a
straightforward definition of social visibility, the most reasonable
interpretation is that the asylum applicant’s community perceives that
members with shared characteristics are a group within society.
B. Particularity
In In re C-A-, the BIA also mentioned that a group of “noncriminal
informants” was “too loosely defined to meet the requirement of
particularity,” but offered no further elaboration on what this particularity
95
requirement entailed. In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA elaborated:
The essence of the “particularity” requirement . . . is whether the
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question,
as a discrete class of persons. While the size of the proposed group may
be an important factor in determining whether the group can be so
recognized, the key question is whether the proposed description is
sufficiently “particular,” or is “too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark
96
for determining group membership.’

90. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, No. 09-71571, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18661, at *9 (9th Cir. Sept.
7, 2011) (Bea, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2009)), vacated en banc, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1773 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2012).
91. Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and
Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 Refugee
Surv. Q. 46, 60–61 (2010).
92. In re Kasinga, 21 I.&N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996).
93. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I.&N. Dec. 819, 819 (BIA 1990).
94. Musalo, supra note 91, at 61.
95. See 23 I.&N. Dec. 951, 957 (BIA 2006).
96. 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29
(8th Cir. 2008)).
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Like social visibility, the particularity requirement has been
97
criticized for merely “compound[ing] the confusion.” Judge Bea points
to Ninth Circuit cases that apply the particularity requirement
98
inconsistently. Sometimes, asylum is denied for lack of particularity
when the PSG members do not share the same unity of origin or some
99
other demographic tie. Other times, unity of origin is irrelevant and
100
asylum is granted. “There is no discernible basis for these divergent
outcomes—other than, perhaps, a given panel’s sympathy for the
101
characteristics of the group at issue.” Judge Bea finds the particularity
requirement disturbing because an asylum applicant “avoid[ing]
persecution in her native land deserves a legal system governed not by
the vagaries and policy preferences of a given panel, but by well-defined
102
and consistently-applied rules.”

III. Asylum Claims Based on Resisting Gang Recruitment:
Implications of MATTER OF S-E-GIn Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA pointed to the lack of social visibility
and particularity in the applicant’s proposed PSGs when it denied asylum
to three siblings who feared persecution in El Salvador after resisting
103
gang recruitment. Matter of S-E-G- is important because it is one of the
BIA’s published decisions, and the Courts of Appeals are required to
defer to the BIA’s definition of a PSG if the BIA’s analysis is
104
reasonable. But Matter of S-E-G- does not render all PSGs based on
resisting gang recruitment per se invalid for lacking social visibility and
particularity. Depending on the facts and record in a given case, future
asylum applicants could articulate a PSG that is both socially visible and
sufficiently particular to meet the new BIA standard. First, however, it is
necessary to understand why PSGs based on resisting gang recruitment
should not be precluded by established precedent.

97. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, No. 09-71571, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18661, at *9 (9th Cir. Sept.
7, 2011) (Bea, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. See Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying an asylum claim based on
membership in the PSG “government informants in the Philippines targeted by gangs”).
100. In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit granted
an asylum claim based on membership in a PSG of homosexuals with female sexual identities, “despite
the fact that members of the proposed group: (1) could come from any origin or bloodline, and (2) did
not necessarily share any beliefs or interests other than their sexual identity.” Henriquez-Rivas, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 18661, at *14.
101. Henriquez-Rivas, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18661, at *14.
102. Id. at *15.
103. The same day that the BIA decided Matter of S-E-G-, it published a similar opinion that
denied asylum to an applicant who applied as a member of two PSGs: “persons resistant to gang
membership” and “young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs.” See Matter of E-AG-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 591, 591 (BIA 2008).
104. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984).
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A. Asylum Determinations Are Based on the Factual Record of
Each Individual Case
Asylum cases must be decided on the facts and evidence set forth in
the record of each individual case. One of the most important Supreme
Court asylum cases, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, instructs courts to consider
each case by the “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
105
record.” In Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court denied asylum to a man
who fled forced recruitment from a guerilla group in Guatemala because
evidence in the record did not compel the conclusion that he was
persecuted on account of his political opinion (the protected ground he
106
asserted). But the Supreme Court’s decision in Elias-Zacarias did not
prevent other asylum applicants who fled guerrilla recruitment from
proving that they were persecuted on account of their political opinions.
In Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Elias-Zacarias does not stand for the proposition that attempted
recruitment by a guerrilla group will never constitute persecution on
account of the asylum seeker’s political beliefs. Rather, Elias-Zacarias
instructs courts to carefully consider the factual record of each case
when determining whether the petitioner’s fear of future persecution
due to his refusing recruitment attempts constitutes persecution on
107
account of political beliefs.

The Eleventh Circuit granted asylum to Martinez-Buendia because
“[u]nlike the record in Elias-Zacarias, the specific facts of this case make
it clear that Martinez-Buendia politically opposed the FARC and that
her political beliefs were the reason for her refusal to cooperate with the
108
FARC.” The court based its decision on a well-established principle in
asylum law: that each applicant has a chance to prove eligibility for
asylum based on the facts of her own case.
The Ninth Circuit hears more asylum appeals in any given year than
does any other circuit, and it also has long-standing precedent that
asylum cases must be decided on the individual facts and evidence in the
109
record of any given case. In 1969, the Ninth Circuit held in Kovac v.
INS that the “petitioner was entitled to a determination based upon the
110
probability of persecution of himself, not of others.” The BIA had
denied asylum to Kovac because it assumed there was not a high
probability of persecution in Kovac’s case, but the BIA had based this
assumption on the record of another, similar case. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the BIA’s decision, reasoning that every asylum applicant is

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (2006)).
Id.
616 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
Id.
Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id.
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entitled to an individualized analysis based on her own record. The
Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed this position in Taslimi v. Holder when
112
it stated that each case “must” be decided on “its individual facts.”
B. MATTER OF S-E-G- Was Decided on the Facts in the Record
Although Elias-Zacarias involved an applicant’s political opinion
and Kovac involved the probability of persecution, the validity of an
applicant’s PSG should also be based on the unique facts of the
applicant’s case. In asylum cases, the stakes are high. Denial of an
otherwise valid claim can result in death. The requirement that each case
be decided on its own facts is indispensable if asylum claims are to be
decided accurately. Every asylum applicant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to prove her eligibility for asylum.
Matter of S-E-G- involved three siblings who fled El Salvador
because they feared gang persecution after resisting recruitment
113
efforts. MS-13 gang members tried to recruit the two brothers to join
114
their gang and beat them when they refused. The gang members
threatened to kill the brothers if they did not join the gang and
115
threatened to rape or harm their sister. The siblings did not report
these incidents to the police because they feared retaliation and believed
116
the police could not help. After MS-13 members killed a young boy in
their neighborhood for not joining the gang, the three siblings fled and
117
came to the United States. They applied for asylum as members of two
PSGs: “(1) Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment
efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the
gang based on their own personal, moral and religious opposition to the
gang’s values and activities; and (2) family members of such Salvadoran
118
youth.”
An immigration judge found the siblings’ testimony credible, but
119
denied them asylum. The BIA affirmed, holding that the siblings’
120
proposed PSGs lacked social visibility and particularity. But the BIA’s
holding in Matter of S-E-G- was based on the specific facts in the record
of that case. The BIA held that the PSGs lacked social visibility because
“[t]here [was] little in the background evidence of record to indicate that
Salvadoran youth who are recruited by gangs but refuse to join (or their
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
590 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2010).
24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 2008).
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id. at 585.
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family members) would be ‘perceived as a group’ by society.” Similarly,
the BIA held that “the purported social groups in this case lack
particularity,” explaining that the PSGs’ defining “characteristics remain
122
amorphous because people’s ideas of what those terms mean can vary.”
Because the BIA adjudicated Matter of S-E-G- based on the record of
that case, there is room for future asylum applicants to distinguish Matter
of S-E-G- and build a record proving the social visibility and particularity
of their asserted PSGs.
C. Circuit Court Interpretations of MATTER OF S-E-G- Are
Overbroad
Although the holding in Matter of S-E-G- was based on the facts
and evidence in the record of that case, the Courts of Appeals often
interpret Matter of S-E-G- too broadly, precluding all asylum applicants
123
fleeing forced gang recruitment from asylum. For example, in RamosLopez v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit cited Matter of S-E-G- when it denied
asylum to an applicant whose proposed social group was “young
Honduran men who have been recruited by the MS-13 but who refuse to
124
join.” The Ninth Circuit claimed that “the BIA concluded [in Matter of
S-E-G-] that those who have resisted recruitment are not in a substantially
125
different situation from anyone who has crossed the gang.” This
statement exemplifies an interpretation of Matter of S-E-G- that is broad
and incorrect. The BIA did not mention “those who have resisted
126
recruitment” in Matter of S-E-G-. The BIA first made reference to the
record and then stated that “[t]he respondents are . . . not in a
substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the

121. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 585 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See, e.g., Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying an asylum claim
based on political opinion, religion, and membership in the PSG “young women recruited by gang
members who resist such recruitment”); Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010)
(denying asylum for lack of nexus to the PSG “family members of youth who have been subjected to
recruitment efforts by the gangs and who have rejected membership”); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder,
574 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 2009) (denying an asylum claim based on anti-gang political opinion);
Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying an asylum claim based on
membership in the PSG “young Honduran men who have been recruited by MS-13 but who refuse to
join”).
124. Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 858. Ramos-Lopez is discussed in this Note because it was the
Ninth Circuit’s first published decision after its en banc decision in Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558
F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), which granted Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statute—what crimes constitute an act of moral turpitude. In Ramos-Lopez, the court
interpreted Marmolejo-Campos as binding the court to give Chevron deference to the BIA’s
precedential decisions of which social groups qualify as cognizable PSGs. Id.; see Barrios v. Holder,
581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying asylum to a Guatemalan who resisted gang recruitment
because his argument was “indistinguishable from the argument made in Ramos-Lopez”).
125. Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See 24 I.&N. Dec. at 581.
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127

gang.” Because the decision in Matter of S-E-G- was based on the facts
in that case, the BIA did not impose a per se rule that every PSG defined
in part by “resisting gang recruitment” is invalid.
Interpreting Matter of S-E-G- to preclude granting asylum to all
applicants who have resisted forced gang recruitment is incorrect and
goes against the well-established principle that every asylum case be
decided on its own facts. Even if the Ninth Circuit in Ramos-Lopez and
128
other circuit courts in analogous cases make overbroad statements that
seemingly indicate a categorical rule, the holdings in such cases are still
based on their particular facts and do not categorically foreclose future
cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit held in Ramos-Lopez that “[t]here
[was] no evidence in the record that young men who have been recruited
129
by the MS-13 in Honduras are generally visible to society.” Similarly,
130
the court found “no evidence” to establish sufficient particularity.
Because Ramos-Lopez was decided on the evidence and facts in the
record, there is no binding precedent foreclosing a grant of asylum to all
131
applicants who resisted forced gang recruitment.
Every asylum applicant has a chance to prove her eligibility for
asylum. After Matter of S-E-G-, asylum applicants who resisted gang
recruitment fight an uphill battle, especially in proving social visibility
and particularity. But every asylum applicant has the opportunity to
describe the individual facts and circumstances in her case. These cases
are not foreclosed until the courts adjudicate them on their individual
merits.

IV. A Department of Homeland Security Brief Reveals
Strategies for Establishing Social Visibility and Particularity
Even though Matter of S-E-G- does not foreclose the possibility of
future asylum applicants articulating a PSG that is socially visible and
particular, distinguishing Matter of S-E-G- and succeeding on the facts of

127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d
at 1136.
129. Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 862 (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (“There is obviously some
ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear’ which can only be given concrete meaning through a
process of case-by-case adjudication.”); Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at 26 (“This argument fails because
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the putative social group was not legally
cognizable.”); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1138 (“Substantial evidence therefore supports the
conclusion that Bonilla-Morales has not carried her burden to show that she is eligible for asylum
based on a well-founded fear of future persecution.”); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 595, (7th Cir.
1991) (“The petitioners are therefore right to demand that the BIA engage in a careful, individualized
review of the evidence presented in their applications and hearings.”); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d
1478, 1488 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Decisions regarding parole, asylum, and withholding of deportation
must be made only after considering the particular circumstances of each individual’s case.”).
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one’s individual case will prove difficult. Courts’ inconsistent application
of the social visibility and particularity requirements demonstrate that
“instead of clarifying the ‘particular social group’ analysis, identification
132
of these two factors has only compounded the confusion.” Here,
instead of applying the BIA’s unworkable definitions of social visibility
and particularity, litigants can attempt to utilize the Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) interpretation of the new requirements.
The DHS represents the federal government against asylum
applicants in removal (deportation) proceedings, so its interpretation of
133
social visibility and particularity should be persuasive. In 2009, the DHS
filed a supplemental brief in Matter of L-R-, where it provided a template
for a Mexican woman and victim of domestic violence to articulate a PSG
134
with social visibility and particularity. The brief sets forth a framework
for a domestic violence case, but the arguments and reasoning are
illuminating for all PSG cases, including those of individuals who resisted
a gang’s recruitment efforts. Although the brief’s interpretation of social
visibility and particularity is not binding on immigration judges or the BIA,
it should be persuasive because the arguments come directly from an
135
immigrant’s adversary in asylum hearings.
A. Social Visibility
The DHS brief suggested that Ms. L-R- establish “social visibility”
by presenting evidence to reflect a “societal view . . . that the status of a
woman in a domestic relationship places women into a segment of society
that will not be accorded protection from harm inflicted by a domestic
136
partner.” This interpretation of social visibility diverges from the BIA’s
definition—the “extent to which members of society perceive those with
137
the characteristic in question as members of a social group” —and helps
to clarify the analysis by giving a tangible idea of the “societal view” of
members of the PSG. The DHS’s interpretation of social visibility
requires evidence that the government does not provide protection to the
applicant’s PSG.
Ms. L-R- succeeded in establishing the social visibility of her PSG
by testifying that the police refused to help her and by submitting
country-conditions evidence that cultural norms in Mexico condone
132. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, No. 09-71571, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18661, at *5.
133. Asylum officers also work for the U.S. Citizens and Immigration Services, which is part of the
Department of Homeland Security. See Asylum Officer Position Summary, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., http://www.uscis.gov (last visited May 1, 2012).
134. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 4, at 7–21.
135. Ctr. for Gender & Refugee Studies, Matter of L.R., What the DHS Brief and IJ Decision in
L.R. Mean for Domestic Violence Asylum Claims and Gender-Based Claims More Broadly, U. Cal.
Hastings C.L., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/campaigns/Matter%20of%20LR.php (last visited May 1, 2012).
136. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 4, at 18 (emphasis added).
137. In re C-A-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 951, 960 (BIA 2006).
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138

domestic abuse. Likewise, certain individuals in El Salvador should be
able to prove they fit within a segment of society that is not accorded
protection from gang violence. Country-conditions evidence can
demonstrate that groups more vulnerable to gangs’ forced recruitment
tactics comprise PSGs that are not provided protection from gangs’
forceful recruitment tactics.
1. Gang-Controlled Neighborhoods
Individuals from gang-controlled communities receive considerably
less protection from gangs’ forceful recruitment tactics than average
members of Salvadoran society. The police do not patrol many of the
gang-controlled communities, rendering youth from these neighborhoods
139
more susceptible to repeated harm and recruitment efforts. In some
140
neighborhoods, the police must even ask for permission to enter. After
Mano Dura laws came into effect, gang members have become
141
indistinguishable from non-gang members. Police in El Salvador are
often criticized for imputing gang membership to innocent youth and
incarcerating young men for looking like or associating with a gang
142
member. A Harvard report on gangs in El Salvador reports that young
men from gang-controlled neighborhoods “face intimidation, threats,
and physical harm from the gang recruiting them, while their residence in
a certain neighborhood signals gang affiliation to outsiders and leaves
143
them vulnerable to police violence and to violence from other gangs.”
The report demonstrates that there is a societal view that this segment of
society receives considerably less protection from gangs and fits the
DHS’s interpretation of social visibility.
2. Prisons and Detention Centers
Statutory bars prohibit granting asylum to persons who have
144
committed serious crimes, but many young men in El Salvador are
arrested arbitrarily. One non-gang member reported being placed into
145
custody every time the police saw him, at least ten or eleven times.
Another non-gang member reported that the police arrested him various
146
times, imprisoning him without any proof that he committed a crime.

138. Brief of Respondents-Appellants, Matter of L-R-.
139. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 429.
140. Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note 11.
141. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 27 (quoting B.F., staff member at a youth center).
142. Id. at 84–95.
143. Id. at 77 (emphasis added) (quoting Interview with Jose Miguel Cruz, Dir. of the Instituto
Universitario de Opinión Pública (Univ. Inst. for Pub. Op. Research), San Salvador (Mar. 31 2006)).
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2010).
145. Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note 7, at 89.
146. Id.
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Although such individuals are usually released or acquitted for lack of
147
evidence, “pre-trial detention centers are often in worse conditions
148
than the prisons.” While awaiting trial, these individuals face extreme
risk of forced recruitment by gang members, without any protection from
the police.
Prisoners and individuals temporarily detained before trial could
establish social visibility by showing they are not accorded adequate
protection from a gang’s forceful recruitment tactics. Anti-gang legislation
149
made prisons overcrowded and difficult to control. Many prisoners had
no choice but to join a gang: Former gang members report having joined
150
in prison in exchange for protection from other prisoners. These
prisoners compose a segment of society that is not accorded police
protection from gang violence. Pursuant to the DHS brief’s definition of
social visibility, prisoners should be able to assert a PSG that is socially
visible.
3. At-Risk Youth
There is also a societal view that at-risk youth are not accorded
protection from gang violence. This can be seen in the various laws and
151
initiatives that address the problem of youth joining gangs. Opposing
political parties have also proposed amendments to the penal code that
would make the use of minors an aggravating circumstance of a crime, or
would make recruitment of children into criminal organizations
152
punishable by ten to fifteen years in prison. These measures prove that
society views at-risk children as a segment of society not accorded
adequate protection from gangs.
Although these measures are a step in the right direction, at-risk
youth will remain vulnerable to gang recruitment until the initiatives are
meaningfully applied. The current administration has implemented
programs to help vulnerable youth, but at least one government director
implementing the programs believes they will suffer from inadequate
153
funding. Children are likely to remain a segment of society that is not
accorded police protection from gang violence. PSGs comprising at-risk
youth should fall squarely within the DHS’s definition of social visibility.

147. Id. at 49; see supra note 37.
148. See Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 430.
149. Interview with Edgardo Alberto Amaya Cobar, supra note 11.
150. Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 430 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations in Honduras 4 (2006)).
151. Interview with Mario Francisco Mena Mendez, supra note 11; see supra notes 31–43, 63–64
and accompanying text.
152. See Fogelbach, supra note 1, at 430. See generally Código Penal art. 30 (El Sal.).
153. Interview with Mario Francisco Mena Mendez, supra note 11.
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B. Particularity
The prevailing definition of particularity requires the defining
characteristics of a PSG to enable an adjudicator to determine who falls
154
within the ambit of the PSG and who does not. In Matter of S-E-G-, the
BIA stated that the “key question is whether the proposed description is
sufficiently ‘particular,’ or is ‘too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark
155
for determining group membership.’” The BIA offered little guidance
or coherent application in Matter of S-E-G- beyond stating that the
proposed PSGs failed the particularity requirement because “people’s
156
ideas of what those terms mean can vary.”
Similar to its interpretation of social visibility, the DHS brief offers
an interpretation of particularity that is easier to apply when PSG
members come from seemingly dispersed segments of society. The DHS
noted two characteristics of Ms. L-R-’s social group—Mexican women in
157
domestic relationships who are unable to leave —that might be
considered “too amorphous,” but maintained that a fact finder could still
“determine with clarity whether an applicant is or is not a member of the
158
group.” First, the DHS stated that the term “domestic relationship”
may raise concerns, but suggested that an adjudicator look to a definition
of a “domestic relationship” in U.S. immigration law to see if an
159
Second, the DHS stated that
applicant satisfies that definition.
although a “victim’s inability to leave” may seem amorphous, whether
the applicant fits into the PSG can be determined on a “case-by-case,
160
fact-specific” basis. The DHS essentially condoned an interpretation of
particularity that, when the terms of the PSG fail to convey a concrete
benchmark, encourages judges to determine whether the applicant fits
into the PSG in each individual case.
Individuals from gang-controlled neighborhoods might be able to
articulate a PSG with terms that make the PSG sufficiently particular.
Mounting evidence shows which neighborhoods in El Salvador are
controlled by gangs. Research compiled by the Comisión Salvadoreña
Antidrogas—the
Salvadoran
Antidrug
Commission—provides
161
information on gang controlled neighborhoods by municipality. For
example, in the Aguilares municipality in San Salvador, the 18th Street

154. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008).
155. Id. (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008)).
156. Id. (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2008)).
157. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 4, at 4–6.
158. Id. at 19.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 20. The DHS specifically compared the “particularity” assessment to the adjudicator’s
“case-by-case, fact-specific examinations of whether it would be reasonable to expect the victim to
[relocate within her country] under all circumstances.” Id.
161. See Fogelbach supra note 1, at 430.
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gang wields substantial control in the neighborhoods San José, Las
162
Pampas, Las Tres Campanas, and Los Palacios; MS-13 is present in the
neighborhoods Las Pampitas, Mangos, Santa Eugenia, Girón, Barrio El
163
Calvario, Cantón El Piñalito, and Caserío El Chorizo. An asylum
applicant could present proof of residence and other documentation that
they are from an area controlled by gangs and articulate a PSG
comprising members from that neighborhood.
Similarly, individuals who confront forced recruitment in prisons
might be able to prove that they fit within a PSG which is sufficiently
particular. The applicant could include evidence of his incarceration and
evidence regarding the jail to establish particularity. Newspaper articles
documenting prison riots could also help prove that this individual was in
a prison where virtually no one was protected from the gangs.
Of the segments of society most vulnerable to forced gang
recruitment, at-risk youth might have the most difficulty establishing
PSGs which are sufficiently particular. “Youth” is an amorphous term by
its nature, but articulating a discrete age group might yield more success.
Moreover, at-risk youth who have fled forced gang recruitment could
show evidence that they go to a school or live on a street especially
dominated by gangs. Current programs seeking to help youth could
provide documentation on areas and groups of children most vulnerable
164
to gang recruitment.
A PSG such as “fourteen-year-old children unable to escape gang
recruitment” is no more amorphous than “women who are unable to
leave an abusive domestic relationship.” The DHS brief proposed that
whether a woman was unable to leave could be assessed on a “case-by165
case, fact-specific examination[].” Using this same reasoning, whether a
child is unable to escape a gang’s forceful recruitment tactics should be
assessed on the individual facts of each case.
The DHS brief’s liberal definitions of social visibility and
particularity are difficult to deny because they come from an asylum
seeker’s adversary. “Social visibility” does not require a group to be
literally visible to the naked eye; it can be satisfied with a societal view of
a segment of society that is not accorded protection from harm. Likewise,
when a term in a proposed PSG’s definition fails to convey a benchmark
for group membership adequate to establish “particularity,” an
adjudicator can apply the term to the facts of each individual case to see
166
whether the applicant fits within the PSG. These definitions benefit
individuals from the segments of society most vulnerable to gang
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 429–30.
Id. at 430.
Interview with Mario Francisco Mena Mendez, supra note 11.
DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 4, at 20.
Interview with Mario Francisco Mena Mendez, supra note 11.

Grayner_63-HLJ-1418 (Do Not Delete)

June 2012]

ESCAPING FORCED GANG RECRUITMENT

6/24/2012 8:21 PM

1441

recruitment, and will help them establish cognizable PSGs and eligibility
for asylum.

Conclusion
Until recently, the BIA defined a particular social group as a group
whose members share a “common, immutable characteristic” that
“members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
167
consciences.” Individuals fleeing forced gang recruitment fit within the
scope of this definition. The PSG in Matter of S-E-G- either described
characteristics the siblings could not change (“Salvadoran youth who
have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have
rejected or resisted membership in the gang”), or characteristics they
should not have to change because the characteristics are fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences (refusal to join was “based on
their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values
168
and activities”). If the Acosta standard were still the relevant threshold,
the siblings in Matter of S-E-G- likely would have been granted asylum.
A return to the Acosta standard is unlikely, and the new social
visibility and particularity requirements are the true hurdles for asylum
seekers fleeing forced gang recruitment. Yet when applying the DHS’s
interpretation of these two terms, segments of society most vulnerable to
forced recruitment—including those from gang-controlled neighborhoods,
former prisoners, and at-risk youth—might be able to prove that their
PSG is socially visible and sufficiently particular.
Individuals fleeing forced gang recruitment are deserving of asylum.
Matter of S-E-G- is a difficult hurdle to their eligibility, but advocates and
judges can apply Matter of S-E-G- and the cases interpreting it and
conclude that well-documented cases qualify for asylum under a PSG
that includes those subject to forced gang recruitment. Future applicants
should seek out skilled experts who can individually assess the risks of
each applicant based on factors including age, neighborhood, school,
socioeconomic status, laws passed to protect the group and the success of
those laws, and the individual’s past experiences with gang members. The
DHS supplemental brief from the Matter of L-R- provides important
guidance on how attorneys can prove that their clients fit into a
cognizable PSG that is both socially visible and particular. Immigration
judges, the BIA, and the Courts of Appeals should not feel constrained by
precedent. They should interpret the narrow holding in Matter of S-E-Gas limited to the facts in that case and grant asylum to future applicants
who are eligible and deserving of protection.
167. Matter of Acosta, 19 I.&N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (BIA 1985).
168. 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008).
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